State of Utah v. Joseph Gonzales : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
State of Utah v. Joseph Gonzales : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Sheldon R. Carter; counsel for appellant.
Catherine M. Johnson; assistant attorney general; Jan Graham; attorney general; counsel for
appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Gonzales, No. 990147 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2045
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH RALPH GONZALES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990147-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF EVIDENCE TAMPERING, A SECOND-
DEGREE FELONY, IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, UTAH, HONORABLE ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
PRESIDING 
SHELDON R. CARTER (0589) 
3325 North University 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON (5975) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0180 
(801)366-0180 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
*t of Appeals 
NOV 0 3 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH RALPH GONZALES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990147-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF EVIDENCE TAMPERING, A SECOND-
DEGREE FELONY, IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, UTAH, HONORABLE ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
PRESIDING 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON (5975) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0180 
(801) 366-0180 
SHELDON R. CARTER (0589) 
3325 North University 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
affirmation, including a notary or other person taking evidence in connection with any of 
these proceedings." 
Although, contrary to defendant's position, the police stopped Hicks' car as part of 
an investigation, the characterization of the stop is not the only relevant consideration. In 
accordance with the terms of the statute, the critical inquiry is whether defendant believed 
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted. Here, 
defendant was involved in a drive-by shooting followed by police pursuit. Under the 
circumstances, defendant must have been aware that the police had commenced an 
investigation, and that he faced arrest and related judicial proceedings. Therefore, the 
evidence and reasonable inferences supported the jury's determination that defendant 
concealed the marijuana and assisted with the concealment of the gun in the belief that an 
official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction for evidence tampering. 
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inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable mir is must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); see also State v. Goddard 871 P.2d 540, 
543 (Utah 1994); State v. Harlev. 982 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah App. 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999) provides: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation;.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999) provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of 
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of evidence tampering, a second-degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999), and one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (89 grams of marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third-degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998) (R. 1-2). 
Following a trial on April 9, 1998, a jury found defendant guilty as charged of 
evidence tampering (R. 192). On the drug possession charge, the jury convicted 
defendant of the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance (id.). 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH RALPH GONZALES, 
Defendant/Appellant 
CaseNo.990147-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his conviction of evidence tampering, a second- degree felony 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction of the case in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction 
for evidence tampering where a bullet clip in defendant's 
pocket matched a concealed gun used in a drive-by shooting 
and defendant admitted that marijuana stashed under a car 
seat was his? 
In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, an 
appellate court reviews the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. The court reverses a jury 
was sitting in the driver's seat (R. 314 at 9). Tl • car's windows were tinted, and Lea 
could not see whether there were any passengers (R. 314 at 16). Lea let up on the gas a 
little, looked over, and kept driving (R. 314 at 8). She drove further down 1400 South, 
then turned and headed south (R. 314 at 9). She passed the four-way stop on Main Street 
and 1600 South and traveled a few more blocks (R, 314 at 9-10). 
Then Lea noticed the headlights of a car behind her (R. 314 at 10). She turned 
again onto 1800 South and traveled on (R. 314 at 11). The other car reappeared, stopped 
at an intersection (id). It was the same car Lea had seen behind the stores (id). Lea 
turned onto another street, traveled a bit further, and saw the other car stop at the 
intersection of 180 West and 1800 South (id). Lea turned again, and the other car 
followed (R. 314 at 12). 
Lea headed up a residential cul-de-sac (R. 314 at 12). As she and Mike drove 
away, the other car stopped (id.). 
The driver of the other car, Christopher Hicks, fired a gunshot at Lea and Mike 
(id., R. 314 at 16). When Lea and Mike realized what was happening, Lea stopped the 
car, and she and Mike ducked (R. 314 at 13). From her side mirror, Lea could see muzzle 
blasts from the gun (id). The gunman fired between four and six shots (id). 
Lea hastily pulled into a driveway (id). Hicks took off (id). Lea and Mike went 
to Mike's parents' home and called the police (id.). 
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Before sentencing, defendant moved to arrest the judgment on the ground that the 
evidence was insufficient to convict him of evidence tampering (R. 203-14). The trial 
court summarily denied the motion when it imposed sentence (R. 268). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to 1-15 years in prison on the evidence 
tampering charge, and 0-5 years on the drug charge (R. 271). The court suspended the 
sentences and placed defendant on 36 months probation (R. 270-71). The court also 
suspended defendant's obligation to pay $15,000 in fines, but ordered him to pay a 
$1,110 surcharge (R. 270). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 276, extension granted R. 274). He 
does not challenge his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Shooting 
Lea Peacock and her boyfriend Mike spent a quiet Sunday evening in Orem 
watching a video (R. 314 at 6-7). When the movie ended in the early morning hours, 
Mike decided he was hungry, and he and Lea ventured out in search of food (R. 314 at 7). 
The trip nearly cost them their lives. 
Lea and Mike drove to the Sconecutter, then headed west on 1400 South across 
State Street (R. 314 at 7-8). Because of the hour, there were few cars on the road (R. 314 
at 8). 
Lea noticed a car behind some stores (R. 314 at 8-9). A "big guy with a pony tair 
3 
officer through a patrol car window (R. 314 at 52-53). 
Officers searched Hicks' vehicle at the scene (R. 314 at 85). They noticed that the 
rear bench seat cushion was ajar (R. 314 at 87, 94). Under the seat cushion, the officers 
found a bag containing 4 smaller baggies of marijuana on the right side where Todd had 
been sitting (R. 314 at 74, 88, 93). The officers also searched the car's glove 
compartment at the time of the stop (R. 314 at 102). They found papers, pictures, and a 
cell phone, but no handgun (id). 
At the police station, Officer Young told Hicks he would be charged with 
marijuana possession (R. 314 at 89). Defendant, lying handcuffed on the floor about 
three feet away, yelled out "[i]t is not his marijuana, it is my marijuana" (R. 314 at 90). 
Defendant was searched again in connection with being booked into jail (R. 314 at 
90-91). In one of defendant's pants pockets, officers found a handgun clip containing 9-
millimeter bullets (R. 314 at 91). 
The next day, Officer Chris Hendrickson obtained a warrant to search the glove 
box again (R. 314 at 104). He found that when the glove box was open, he could pull it 
downward (R. 314 at 104). When the compartment was pulled down, two things 
occurred: (1) a space behind the dashboard was exposed, and (2) the contents of the 
compartment spilled onto the floor (R. 314 at 104-05). 
Officer Hendrickson reached into the space behind the dashboard and pulled out a 
Branco 9-millimeter handgun (R. 314 at 106-07). The gun contained a thirteen-bullet clip 
6 
'ii is not his Marijuana it is my Marif nana" 
Tug Todd, a passenger in Huks iai i.nmieu in »u • a .Irq, I iL ' left rear' seat 
directly behind Hicks i i n.i MUMMI »-I ^..i.d .is AOVV him up (R. 314 at 22, 25-26x TT 
said fie had « "J„, . ,, \\y the shot(^  were tiled (R. 314 at 25). He maintained th ii -s^k* 
t« < 'M:T i licks pull his arm back inside the 'window, place the gun m his ia|.< mni k.Md for 
the freeway <R. 314 at 22). Todd recalled that when rm - (*icer neai 
Utah Valley Community * -•,,. , j In: iciiiliul > >. • JI ' Ih'i w the utin into the glove 
compartment 
r IJuwed Hicks' car onto the freeway and pulled it over (K .11 I .it ,.!"' * 
<+/;. i IIW uuwv; ~rdered the car's four occupants to place then km. 1 \ho\ v ilieii heads 
and come out of the car one a* ? fi' h ks came out through the 
driver s side duoi uiuJ n .• ..ikv rxited through the passenger's side door (R, 314 af nQ l 
Todt : -*• Hicks came out first, followed by Brad Norton, then defendant, and 
finally Todd (R. 314 at 24). Officer William Young's recoticjtion diffc 
recalled that defendant (rather than Tod- oehirid the 
driver, and that defendant i.<ith. .i 11-1 i if '.14 at 95-96). 
Defendant v-i j " , "very combative" when Young patted him down (R. J * * .u . 
Young's words, defendant "jerked away and started swearing and i ailing inr .i i]ii<vr 
(id). Another officer recalled that defendant was "quite cocky," blowing kisses to 'the 
1
 fhe vehicle was a tw 
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defendant tampered wuh evidence in the belief that an investigation or official proceeding 
was pending or about to be instituted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE INFERENCES 
SUPPORTED THE JURY'S VERDICT BINDING 
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF EVIDENCE TAMPERING 
Defendant asserts that the evidence did not support the jury's guilty verdict on the 
evidence tampering charge. Appellant's Brief at 24. He claims that no direct evidence 
showed that defendant tampered with evidence, and that, in fact, Todd's testimony that he 
did not see defendant hide either the marijuana or the gun tended to exonerate him. 
Appellant's Brief at 19. Defendant asserts that the conviction was impermissibly based 
on speculation and conjecture. Id. 
"We will affirm the jury verdict as 'long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made.'" State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). On the facts of this case, the elements of 
evidence tampering were that defendant, (1) believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation was about to be instituted, (2) either concealed the gun or the marijuana to 
impair the availability of the gun or marijuana in the proceeding or investigation, or 
encouraged or intentionally aided another in such concealment. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-
8 
u nh n i u iHiiliM , pi »"sent (R. 314 at 107). The clip was identical to the clip found in • 
defendant's pants pocket-VR. M < * "~PV ^ --i-K-u 
scene of the shooting (R. 314 at 126). 1 he gun ana t uiicd stolen 
(R. 314 i t 1 • ,,,. 
At uial i iii ii.iiiii.niieii iliat he knew nothing about any marijuana being in the 
c ' •* 25-26, 28). He said he heard about the marijuana loi ilic in si nine JI ihe 
police station (R. 3 14 at 28, 33). Todd claimed that tu tit J noi -itr .I, i^ndani hid1 if ; 
marijuana and did not observe that the seal i •* JHI « w us npi e \i \ 14 at 32-33, lo8-o9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
should decline to address defendant's claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction because he has lailcii to pi . n "Ji.ul llie 
eviden.ee in support of the verd i 11 i iin" i.^  tdn > >' i A \n\* • inferences 
supported the verai* -• * dant's pocket matched the gun used in the 
the rear seat cushion on which defendant was sitting when 
"ehended and under which his marijuana was hidden was u,;„^, . . / 
' J, the evidence supports . ; ; < . . ; .
 s kwn concealing 
*u- ~..« AS w a i ti:i iiJir , , j j - i n k -1 | | , | | defendant hid his marijuana under the car seat as he 
ilii Is II I lit in ooiice. 
Defendant's claim that the police stop of Hicks' car was mil iin iil'k nil |imcmlim.' 
or investigation lacks merit. On the lacts ol this easi.1 ilii" JIII ,; properly found itial 
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the jury. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony." 
State v. Haves. 860 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 
904-05 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)). Furthermore, "[a]n 
appellate court reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence does not reweigh the 
evidence or invv tigate witness credibility." Butterfield v. Cook. 817 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 229, 231 
(Utah 1980)). 
Defendant fails to mention that the magazine found in defendant's pocket was 
identical to the clip found in the gun from which the shots were fired. Although 
defendant does acknowledge that the prosecution introduced the magazine into evidence, 
he fails to acknowledge the evidentiary importance of either the magazine or the fact that 
it was found in defendant's pocket. Appellant's Brief at 14. 
The fact that the clip taken from defendant's pocket matched the clip found in the 
gun Hicks used to shoot at Lea and Mike was important because it gives rise to at least 
two reasonable inferences supporting defendant's conviction for evidence tampering. 
First, the jury could reasonably infer from defendant's possession of the clip that the gun 
was defendant's, and that he passed it forward to Hicks so that Hicks could fire at Lea and 
Mike.2 Since the gun was used in the commission of a crime, defendant would have an 
2Of course, since the gun was stolen, it did not really "belong" to defendant, Hicks, 
or anyone other than the true owner. 
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510(1999), 76-2-202 (!<>9y) \\\t\^\ — -IJMIUI. ted as to those elements (R. 180, 186). 
Defendant Has Not Adequately Marshaled the Evidence. This Court should 
deeliiii1' iff rtMrh defendant's insufficiency claim because he haj tailed lo inajsiiai n 
evidence in support of the verdict. 
. In challenging the sufficienc}/ ot the c v HII'THT i lit - Inn ilen on an appellant is heavy. 
State v Vessey 1998) (citing State v. Lemons. 844 P ?d 
The appellai:. n.^i n larshal all evidence supporting ihe 
; verdict the appellate ; . r -how how the iiiai:>luk"J \" u1' M I 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefiom, r> I;« ,i»'« >, ^sufficient to support the 
trial court's conclusion/" Stale v. Gray. 8SI V M 1 "* 17 I "!25 (Utah App,), cert, denied _ 
H--,u V M ""i l iUi,ih I-*-* *»ii|mr1iii^  State v. DN^. _. P 2d 314, 317 (Utah App 19^2)); 
see also State v. Mossman. 794 P.2d 474.. 476 (Utah 1990^ lncompr... . 
urn*dialing requirement, it is not sufficient for an a tatc evidence 
favorable to his position without pi esontiii^ «lii' evidence ** **v-^ihg the trial court's 
finding, v c M.ue i Lar.,cn S.?8 P 2d 4K7, 491 (Utah _ . ; ^:i aff d 865 V lil i '<> • 
Concealment of the Gun. Defendant's argument Todd's 
statement that he observe,; the glove compartment. 
Appellant * * i was nut required to believe Todd's 
1- whole ui in part. "[Determinations of witness credibility 
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without placing his arm into a three-inch space next to the stereo inside the dashboard, 
and that he had difficulty retrieving the gun even though he did not attempt to reach it 
from the driver's seat (R. 314 at 106). Clearly, Hicks, who was driving, must have 
received assistance in hiding the gun. 
Although Hicks was most likely aided by front-seat passenger Norton in the actual 
concealment ui the gun, the matching clip was in defendant's pocket. Hendrickson 
testified that magazines for handguns are not interchangeable, and that the clip found in 
defendant's pocket would have been manufactured for the Branco 9-millimeter handgun 
alone, and was in fact identical to the clip in the gun (R. 314 at 108-10). He also testified 
that he had extensive experience with firearms, having worked at Wolfe's, Udisco, 
Harmon's and Zinick's, and he had never seen that brand of handgun (R. 314 at 108). 
The most reasonable inference from the officer's testimony is that Hicks, Norton, 
and defendant must have been in collusion during the entire episode, including the 
concealment of the handgun. It was no coincidence that the clip in defendant's pocket fit 
the gun that Hicks fired and Norton helped conceal. Defendant must have participated in 
concealing the gun by either encouraging Hicks to hide the gun or by pocketing the spare 
clip. 
Concealment of Marijuana. Although defendant acknowledges that two officers 
testified that they found marijuana under the displaced rear seat cushion, and a third 
testified that the marijuana was stuffed down into the cushions, he fails to analyze the 
12 
obvious interest .u .
 t.
 f
 Hicks concealed it. Therefore, the jury could reasonably 
have 111 'I -L- fendant encouraged Hicks to hide the gun. 
Alternatively, assuming the gun was originally in i!n L-/ possession, thejuiy could 
reasonably infer from defendant's possession * ii Mn- clip that defendant assisted Hicks in 
dispersing the evidence, Hicks mi^ 1 • i h.ive hidden the gun and passed the clip to 
defendant »<*< - sponsibility for the shooting With tlit gun missm^ iin«l n»'' 
,;
 " i d backseat passenger who could nut u I^• i *t•: no one m 
the car' could conclusively be tied to the sliooiiii).: < indei this scenario, defendant would 
still have been a willing participant ii i the concealment of evidence. 
Properly vidence shows that despite Todd's statemen(s 11M» Hn„ks 
aV .-. • -(v • in the glove box, Hicks could not have put L uai 
ng place without help.3 As Officer Hendrickson teslitW, the hiding place could only 
be accessed by pulling the glove compai tment face down IR. 314 at 104). As 
Hendrickson tunhci iesiifii/il i leittsof the compartment would then spill nnin iin, 
fii x nee "the compartment contained papers, picture* ,tti"i«J < U pd ,«"ie 
when the officers searched it; someone must have JS>I if« d I'• '• in either putting the 
contents back into the compartmen'i i i >- of-nm.' 'fiiTii IT- olace while Hicks hid the gun, (R 
^* * it \ \)L i i-urcnciiiK- !•' ndriekson testified that he could not reach the hiding place 
3In fact, Todd never testified that no one encouraged oi assi »l i, ii •' N: I '«• in hiding the 
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selectively focuses on the evidence most favorable to his position and fails to 
acknowledge or fully discuss the implications of inculpatory evidence. In so doing, 
defendant has failed to meet his burden to adequately marshal the evidence. This Court 
therefore should not address his claims. Vessev. 967 P.2d at 966. In any event, however, 
the direct evidence and reasonable inferences were sufficient to prove the elements of 
evidence tampering beyond a reasonable doubt.4 
POINT II 
THE JURY CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
TAMPERED WITH EVIDENCE IN THE BELIEF THAT 
AN INVESTIGATION OR OFFICIAL PROCEEDING 
WAS PENDING OR ABOUT TO BE INSTITUTED 
Defendant's claim that the police stop of the car was not an official proceeding or 
investigation is without merit. First, as defendant candidly admits, his contention is 
contrary to existing law. Appellant's Brief at 25-26. Second, his claim defies the plain 
language of the applicable statutes. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999) makes it a crime 
to tamper with evidence in the belief that "an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-501 (1999) provides that an 
official proceeding means "any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative, 
or other governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence under oath or 
defendant's suggestion that the jury's verdict was based on racism is without 
merit. Appellant's Brief at 20. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury 
based its decision on any impermissible racial or ethnic bias. 
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significance of the testimony, \\I\I\ Ham •» Brief at 12-15. fn fact,, the evidence tliiii ilie 
back seat cushion was ajai is highly relevant, since the charge ot evident a iuy, 
could also have been based on defendant's concealment ol * lie: <»MI I|IMOA. The evidence 
that the back seat cushion was 'unlatched suppoi ts the rea sonable u n l a c e that defendant 
hastily stuffed the marijuana undei if it. y^,< ^ • wse he knew that capture was imminent. 
Although Todd tesiilK I ili.n lie did noi notice the back seat being aja. 
^ W n < stash the marijuana, the jury was not rev* , . : vci^ioiioi 
\nain, defendant has failed to mai 4kil iniin u * .it conflicted -\ nh 
i uld's account. First, and most important,« "• < • • officers testified that the .rear bench seat 
nHii-nti was ajar, and a tliiicJ sliih?*l ihat it appeared 'the marijuana had been "stutled" 
down liiln (In, spai. i' I'lcivveen the cushions (R. 314 at 74, 87, 94, 1 although 
1 1 that he was last to exit the c ar, O f 11 u t i i ,i ? i *. 1 e j-«" f»' i •" J that defendant was 
the iast one out (R. 341 at 96). Therefore uomi :u v f >• defendant's claims, Todd would not 
have been able to observe defendant loi tin* entire time defendant was in the car 
Otlieer \ oung i^lil'inl fini Hie bench seat could have been detached and ihr in. -
stowed even with defendant and Todd sitting on n < K '• 14 ni !•;< \ I hese facts support the 
reasonable inference that the marijuana was qi lickly stashed while defendant and his 
friends were fleeing police 
sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant *> • i > h u<* 
mars idence and inferences supporting the jui> • defendant 
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